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This paper investigates the empirical link between emission intensity and economic 
growth, using a very large data set of 61,219 Italian manufacturing firms over the period 
2000-2004. As a measure of lagged environmental performance (efficiency) at firm 
level we exploit NAMEA sector for CO2, NOx, SOx data over 1990-1999. The paper 
tests the extent to which (past) environmental efficiency/intensity, which is driven by 
structural features and firm strategic actions, including responses to policies, influences 
firms growth. Our results show, first, a typical trade off generally appearing for the 
three core environmental emissions we analyse: lower environmentally efficiency in the 
recent past allows higher degrees of freedom to firms and relax the constraints for 
growth, at least in this short/medium term scenario. Nevertheless, the size of the 
estimated coefficients is not large. Trade off are significant for two emission indicators 
out of two, but quite negligible in terms of impacts, besides the case of CO2. For 
example, growth is reduced by far less than 0.1% in association to a 1% increase of 
environmental efficiency. Environmental efficiency does not seem a primary cost factor 
and constraint to growth if compared to other factors affecting firm targets and firm 
competitiveness. In addition, non-linearity seems to characterise the economic growth-
environmental performance relationship. Signals of inverted U shape appears: this may 
be a signal that both firm strategies and recent policy efforts are affecting the dynamic 
relationship between environmental efficiency and economic productivity, turning it 
from an usual trade off to a possible joint complementary/co-dynamics, where bad 
environmental performances hamper firm growth and investments in greener 
technologies may be associated to positive economic performances of firms and sectors. 
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Environmental performance 




Address for correspondence: 
 
Massimiliano Mazzanti 
University of Ferrara 
Department of Economics Institutions and Territory  
via Voltapaletto, 11 
44100 Ferrara 
Italy 
E-mail: ma.maz@iol.it    2 
1. Introduction 
 
Over  the  last  few  years,  the  relationship  between  environmental  performance  (emission  intensity, 
environmental  efficiency,  eco-strategies,  etc.)  and  economic  performance  has  received  increased 
attention, also thanks to its role within the ‘Lisbon Objectives’ on growth and innovation and the 
‘Gothenburg priorities’ on sustainable development.  
Within this debate, manufacturing has received much attention, given its relatively high impacts on the 
environment,  and  higher  innovation  potential.  The  research  directions  of  higher  added  value  are 
currently  three:  (i)  the  effects  of  environmental  performances  and  innovations  on  economic 
performances, given the relatively wider space the drivers of environmental innovations have occupied 
(Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008a,b); (ii) an increasing attention to the dynamics of relationships in the short 
run and medium/long run; (iii), extending at micro and meso levels the analyses from manufacturing to 
other industries, as recently proposed by Cainelli et al. (2007) and Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009).  
This paper aims at providing a contribution on points (i) and (ii) above. It focuses on manufacturing 
industry; nevertheless, it uses a very large data set, compared to predominant survey-based analyses 
relying on often small scale samples. It does not suffer from cross-sectional biases, often plaguing ad hoc 
survey data which rarely escape the ‘cross section trap’, if not by repeated surveys over time, since it 
models a dynamic relationship between emission intensity
1 and firm-level economic growth, in others 
words environmental and economic performances at the firm level.  
More  specifically,  this  paper  investigates  the  empirical  link  between  firms  economic  growth  and 
emission  intensity,  using  a  very  large  data  set  of  more  than  60,000  Italian  manufacturing  firms. 
Economic data refer to the period 2000-2004. In order to circumvent the unavailability of data on 
environmental performance indicators at this level of microeconomic detail, we use as a measure of 
environmental efficiency by exploiting sector based NAMEA data, from which we recover firm based 
data. The Italian NAMEA provides detailed data at two digit level on main emissions, value added and 
employees over 1990-2003. Taking data for the periods 1990-1999 and 1992-1995 in order to impose a 
lag structure to the modelled relationship, we reconstruct emission per employees ratios at firm level by 
using sector coefficients of emissions per unit of labour and panel data on employment of firms, as a 
pragmatic and only available proxy of environmental efficiency from official data at firm level. 
Using  this  approach,  the  paper  specifically  tests  the  extent  to  which  (past)  environmental 
efficiency/intensity, which is driven by structural features and firm strategic actions, including eventual 
responses  to  policies,  influences  firms  economic  growth  in  a  short-medium  term  scenario  if  we 
consider the lag we are able to structure between environmental and economic performances.  
                                                 
1 ‘Emission intensity’, namely emissions per unit of labour, is the proxy for ‘environmental efficiency’ we here exploit. 
Further analyses may be carried out by using alternatively ‘emissions per unit of value added’. This is actually the inverse of 
‘environmental efficiency’ as a ratio, but we follow this standard form, widely used in NAMEA analyses (Femia and Panfili, 
2005).   3 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a short summary of the literature that aims at 
synthesising the state of the art of various research directions focusing on environmental innovation, 
environmental performances and economic performances at firm level. Section 3 is first addressed to 
the  definition  of  the  conceptual  framework  on  which  research  hypotheses  are  based,  and  then 
consequently discusses data sources, the empirical model and the econometric methodology. Section 4 
presents  and  comments  on  empirical  outcomes.  Section  5  concludes  and  suggests  lines  of  future 
research.   
 
2. Related literature 
A first main stream of research deals with the drivers of eco-innovation strategies. The seminal work by Jaffe and 
Palmer  (1997),  which  studies  environmental  innovation  (R&D  and  patents)  at  industry  level,  was 
followed by Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), which employs panel data on manufacturing industries to 
provide  new  evidence  on  the  determinants  of  environmental  innovation,  measured  by  number  of 
patents. The European setting has recently been the source of some interesting evidence: Rennings et 
al., (2003) exploit OECD survey data in order to investigate whether environmental auditing schemes 
and pollution abatement innovation are correlated, similarly to the more recent work by Arimura et al. 
(2008) on Japan. Mazzanti and Zoboli (2005, 2008a, b) present evidence for the manufacturing sector at 
a district level, focussing on an extended set of drivers (environmental R&D, policy induced costs, 
EMS, industrial relations, other innovations). Frondel et al., (2004) use an OECD survey dataset on 
manufacturing firms and study internal firm-based strategies, external policy variables, and test drivers 
for  end-of-pipe  measures  or  integrated  cleaner  production  processes.  For  a  recent  comprehensive 
analysis of all works on innovation drivers we refer to Johnstone (2007).  
A  second  stream  of  research  is  focussed  on  environmental  innovation  and  (its)  employment  effects.  The  main 
contributions in this stream include Rennings and Zwick (2001), Rennings et al. (2001), Pfeiffer and 
Rennings (1999). What is relevant to our study is the main hypothesis that increasing environmental 
efficiency by environmental innovations strengthens competitiveness and the firm performance, with 
or without policy stimulus. An ancillary hypothesis is that eco-efficiency investments require higher 
amounts of labour. The reasoning is that, on the one hand, product innovation spurs employment since 
it creates new demand, while, on the other hand, process innovations decrease employment since they 
are  usually  labour  saving.  Some  employment  compensation  may  occur  as  a  result  of  indirect 
price/market driven effects. It should be noted that this is a two stage process in which first the firm 
decides whether or not to invest in innovation, and second optimizes the volume of labour following 
the innovation process. 
Rennings and Zwick (2001) is based on a sample of eco-innovative firms for five EU countries, in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. This is a rather unique study which provides evidence related to   4 
manufacturing but also includes some evidence concerning eco-innovations in the service sector. They 
find that in most firms employment does not change as a consequence of innovation, but this may be 
due to the limited period covered by the survey. Econometric results show that, apart from some 
effects  registered  for  product  innovations,  eco-innovation  typologies  do  not  influence  the  level  of 
employment,  though  as  expected  (Caroli  and  van  Reenen,  2001),  according  to  their  evidence 
environmentally oriented innovations seem to lead to a skills bias effect. Also, end of pipe innovations 
are related to a higher probability of job losses, while innovations in recycling have a positive effect on 
employment.  
Employment  effects  may  be  thus  be  unevenly  distributed,  with  strong  negative  effects  from 
environmental strategies/policies on low skills intensive industries and potentially positive effects on 
other industries. It could also be argued that product and process eco-innovation strategies may bring 
about (potentially negative) net effects on employment, attributable to a destruction of the low skilled 
labour force (administrative staff) and a creation of high skilled positions (R&D). 
Third, there is a complementary stream of literature that has focused on the various static and dynamic relationships 
between eco-innovation, environmental performances and firm performances
2. Konar and Cohen (2001) investigated 
the effect on firm market performance of tangible and intangible assets, including two environmental 
performance-related elements as explanatory factors. Cohen et al. (1997) also analysed the relationship 
between environmental and financial performances. Overall, these authors found that investing in a 
‘green’ portfolio did not incur a penalty and even produced positive returns.  
Less recent works by Gray and Shadbegian (1995) used total factor productivity and growth rates for 
plants over 1979-1990 as performance indicators to test the impact of environmental regulation and 
pollution abatement expenditures. They found that $1 more expenditure on abatement is associated 
with more than 1$ worth of productivity losses. They found that, when analysing variation over time or 
growth rates, the relationship between abatement costs and productivity is not significant. Greenstone 
(2001) estimates the effects of environmental regulations, using data for 1,75 million observations of 
plants  in  the  1967-87  US  censuses  of  manufacturers.  Environmental  regulations  negatively  affect 
growth in employment, output and capital shipments. 
Finally,  we  would  point  to  recent  EU  based  studies,  that  focus  on  the  (short  term)  effects  of 
environmental strategies on the stock performances of corporations, using standard cross section/panel 
approaches  (Ziegler  et  al.,  2008)  and  ‘event’  studies  that  analyse  whether  there  are  exogenous 
unexpected policy effects on the short term performance of environmentally minded firms. The latter 
are criticized for their intrinsic very short term focus. Although valuable, and based on official datasets, 
                                                 
2 A fourth correlated stream of research focuses on the ‘drivers of firm environmental performance’ including, among 
others,  Foulon et al. (2002), Cole at al (2005), Collins and Harris (2003). This is minor in scale given the paucity of data and 
the difficulty of eliciting such data on real environmental outcomes (non monetary quantification of externalities) even by 
surveys   5 
we  believe  that  the  value  of  evidence  focusing  on  stock  market  performance  is  limited  since  the 
majority of firms, especially in Italy, are of medium or small sized, and do not appear in stock market 
data. Innovation dynamics are close to productivity trends which, in the end, are the main engines of 
firm performance.  
Our paper is embedded  in the third research directions, focusing on the effects of environmental 
(emission) intensity on firms economic performance here measured by firms turnover growth. The 
possible contribution of our work stems from: the focus on a dynamic perspective, the use of real firm 
performance indicators, the lagged structure of the data set and the very large number of firms. The 
main  ‘limit’  is  the  exploitation  of  sector  data  instead  of  micro  data  for  proxing  environmental 
emissions, depending on the general unavailability of real environmental performances measures at the 
microeconomic level, for large sample of firms in Italy. This is confirmed by the recent paper by 
Arimura  et  al.  (2008)  who  study  the  ISO/EMS  (voluntary  agreements)  effects  on  environmental 
performances on the basis of an OECD survey on environmental performance of firms. It is striking 
that the dependent variable ‘environmental performances’ is constructed by means of self reported data 
using an ordered format (no change, decrease or increase in emissions). Though the authors carry out 
some test and external validity checking for assuring data credibility, the answers seem to be affected by 
the typical bias that may arise when likert scale are offered, with in addition the fact that the issue is 
highly critical from a firm’s perspective. Thus, though the first best would to use real environmental 
performance data at the firm level (challenge for future research in the future), and the exploitation of 
self reported survey data is a plausible second best, the (panel) nature of NAMEA data disaggregated at 
two digit level offer a robust framework that hybridize firm and sector data to analyse economic-
environment relationship
3.    
 
3. Conceptual framework, data and methodology 
3.1 The theoretical framework  
This section briefly sketches the main elements of the conceptual framework on which the set of 
hypothesis tested in the empirical part is rooted, trying to discuss what factors may support ‘joint’ 
economic-environmental performances at firm level (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009). 
A  first  set  of  factors  revolve  around  the  ‘Porter’s  hypothesis’  (Jaffe  et  al.,  1995).  Environmental 
regulation may influence innovation and market (rent) creation. In the long run, regulation costs, or 
environmental R&D expenditures, are more than compensated for by the benefits of innovation in 
terms of higher efficiency and/or higher value added. This conclusion seems to run counter to the 
conventional  wisdom  that  environmental  regulation  (like  any  other  regulation,  of  course)  or 
                                                 
3  A  rare  set  of  studies  that  use  real  environmental  performances  to  study  the  co-evolutionary  effects  between  firm 
performances (turnover and profits) and emission intensity of firms are by Earnhart and Lizal (2006, 2007, 2008), who 
exploit a 1996-98 panel for Czech firms. The panel is nevertheless limited to around 400 firms.   6 
spontaneous investments in green firm performances impose significant direct and indirect costs on 
firms and industries, with the primary effect of impacting negatively on economic performance, and 
especially (labour and total factor) productivity.  
Following  the  mainstream  reasoning,  if  the  firm  is  optimising  resource  in  production,  before  the 
implementation of (new) environmental regulation, any additional abatement cost or innovation cost 
deriving from policy enforcement will lead, at least in the short run, to an equivalent reduction in 
productivity/performance, since labour and capital inputs are re-allocated from ‘usual’ or scheduled 
production output to ‘environmental output’ (pollution reduction).  
This emphasis on substitution may stem from the roles in neo-classic reasoning of the assumption of 
optimal allocation of resources in the status quo and of input prices (and green taxes) as innovation 
levers. In fact, resource prices have been the main driver of change only in specific conditions of strong 
relative  price  changes  coupled  with  structural  economic  transformations.  More  generally  it  is 
technology  that  affects  prices  by  changing  factor  combinations  and  capital  intensity.  In  other 
approaches, the development of new production processes is viewed as an ongoing process within 
firms and sectors less reliant on input prices, except in particular circumstances (Kemp, 1997; Krozer 
and Nentjes, 2006). 
Economies  of  scale  and  scope  are  another  argument  leading  to  depart  from  conventional  view.. 
Complementarity and economies of scale and scope, among other factors, might lead to states where 
the productivity effect of environmental investments or compliance becomes positive (plausibly in the 
medium long run)
 4. 
A more general question is whether it is possible to separate eco-innovation from other typologies of 
innovation. In practice it is often not easy to separate the two (Rennings, 2000). With or without policy 
aimed at innovations, cost-saving motivations and demand-related product market objectives could 
work  as  innovation  drivers.  All  could  be  complementary  in  the  ultimate  aim  of  enhancing  firm 
productivity,  and  no  sharply  defined  difference  between  them  may  be  possible,  in  that  (i)  eco-
innovations may generate low or high eco-impacts depending on their nature and their integration with 
other innovations; (ii) standard innovations may also provide eco-innovations. Much of the current 
empirical research is aimed at disentangling intended and unintended (e.g. mere cost savings in the 
more  general  meaning)  eco-effects  stemming  from  innovations:  in  these  approaches,  only  those 
innovations  linked  to  intended  ‘proper’  environmental  strategies  and  effects  are  classified  as  eco-
innovations. A broad definition of eco-innovations encompasses intentional and unintentional actions. 
                                                 
4 “The choice to invest in either change in production process or end of pipe will be used to evaluate the extent to which 
production and abatement is undertaken jointly. End of pipe technologies are considered to reflect evidence of the existence 
of a separable production function, with production the conventional output and abatement of pollution as essentially 
separate plants within a single facility. Different resources are used for each plant. Production process is considered to 
reflect a production process in which abatement and production of the conventional output are integrated, allowing for the 
complementary use of inputs in both abatement and production” (Labonne and Johnstone, 2007, p.3).   7 
This may lead to a framework in which economic and environmental goals are more easily identified as 
being complementary, and are integrated. Jaffe et al. (1995, 2003) note that firms can engage in some or 
a great deal of pollution control “Besides end of pipe technologies, firms usually have strong difficulties 
in  accounting  for  specific  capital  and  current  environmental  expenditures”.  As  discussed  above,  it 
might also be due to the entangled nature of many environmental and ‘normal’ innovations. 
This likely ‘jointness’ of ‘eco’ and ‘normal’ innovations has some connections with the evolutionary 
perspective on industrial dynamics, where the balance between firms’ entries and exits is the main 
driver of development. Along these lines, environmental pressures could constitute an increasing wedge 
between innovative firms (sectors) and less innovative firms, which could in the end, disappear. The 
former may demonstrate higher performance on all-inclusive innovative grounds, positively integrating 
and correlating environmental and non-environmental dynamics. According to evolutionary theory, 
interlinked technologies evolve along a dynamic path, generating positive spillovers and effects on 
productivity. This discussion can also be positioned with the analysis of complementarity regarding 
input factors in the production of innovation and higher performance practices (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990,  1995;  Mohnen  and  Roller,  2005;  Laursen  and  Foss,  2003;  Mazzanti  and  Zoboli,  2008b). 
Complementarity generates increasing returns and non-appropriable innovation rents. 
Another motivation is related to the issue of rent generation and appropriability. The production of 
some ‘environmental goods’ is associated with rents that are appropriable, at least partially, by firms. 
They are in fact correctly defined as the private share of an impure public good, which encompasses 
other  entangled  pure  public  features.  Many  environmental  innovations  combine  an  environmental 
benefit with a benefit for the company or user. The gaps between environmentally accounted and 
standard  productivity  often  emerges  in  the  differences  between  natural  resources  and  correlated 
externalities  (Bruvoll  et  al.,  2003).  Thus,  the  innovation  potential  of  policies,  and  the  associated 
innovative endogenous strategy of firms depend on the features of the environmental goods. Those 
goods  may  be  characterised  by  private  appropriable  rents  and  by  public  good  elements.  This 
complementarity in production, i.e. a technologically-based positive correlation between the private 
(fully appropriable) and the public good elements is potentially linked both to the kind of externalities 
we are dealing with, e.g. local/global emissions, private or public product/process (Kotchen, 2005; 
Rubbelke,  2003;    Loschel  and  Rubbelke,  2005),  and  to  technological  factors,  e.g.  the  relationships 
existing among apparently separate technological dynamics. 
Technology  and  externalities  are  in  any  case  theoretically  interrelated  environments;  and  non-
convexities in production could be an important element for the joint production of private and public 
values,  depending  on  fixed  costs  and  technological  constraints  (Papandreou,  2000;  Boscolo  and 
Vincent, 2003).   8 
To sum up, the key question revolves around the possibility that firms may adopt some environmental 
strategies  even  on  an  endogenous  market-based  path.  Starting  with  the  Porter’s  framework  we 
discussed  elements  that  might  enrich  the  set  of  motivations  behind  a  possible  joint  path  of 
environmental and labour productivity in the medium-long run, even in the absence of direct policy 
intervention. Evolutionary theories and borderline issues, such as complementarity, could constitute 
some conceptual pillars that extend the intrinsically static neoclassic reasoning. 
The ‘pessimistic’ view of a trade-off between firms’ environmental and non-environmental strategies 
may be mitigated by a framework in which those complementarities, which at heart involve different 
technological innovations (labour-oriented, environmentally-oriented), might explain, at least in part, 
why  sustained  increasing  environmental  efficiency  is  compatible  with  sustained  increasing  labour 
productivity in the ex post setting.  
 
3.2 The set of tested hypotheses 
We now specify the main research hypotheses we are testing, that arise from the above discussion. 
 
[H.1].  The  sign  of  the  dynamic  relationship  between  emission  intensity  at  time  t-1  and  economic 
performance  specified  as  firm  growth,  at  time  t,  is  investigated,  by  using  two  different  time  lags: 
emission intensity per  unit of labour averaged over 92-94 and over 95-99. We do expect the closer the 
lag is the more probable that environmental efficiency and economic performances are characterised by 
a trade off rather than complementary dynamics. Disentangled dynamics (statistical insignificance) are 
also a possibility if economic performance is independent on environmental elements.    
 
[H.2]. The shape of the relationship is also investigated by specifying quadratic forms for emission 
intensity.  Non-linearity  is  a  real  world  feature  that  is  analysed  in  both  mainstream  and  alternative 
perspectives, but that assumes special relevance in dynamic scenarios. Were the relationship is non-
linear, that is not only the cross-section (sector) heterogeneity and the lag difference between the two 
‘productivities’  that  matter,  but  also  the  level  of  the  environmental  performances  matters.  Critical 
thresholds may exist, and we do expect non-linear dynamics to represent the real world situation of 
many environmental-economic co-dynamics. It is nevertheless difficult to assess ex ante which shape is 
the more likely one, given empirical evidence is still scarce. If the non linear relationship assumes a U 
shape, this would mean that at low emission intensity the relationship with economic performance is 
associated  to  a  complementary  content,  then  trade  off  emerge  when  the  environmental  efficiency 
worsen.  Otherwise,  in  presence  of  an  inverted  U  shape,  the  trade  off  between  economic  and 
environmental  performances  is  mitigated  at  higher  environmental  intensity.  Further  increases  in 
environmental intensity hampers growth and leads to a co-dynamics between the two sides of firm   9 
objectives. In other words, it may be that only at quite high, or comparatively high, environmental 
pressures, firms (sectors) endogenously implement  (innovative) strategies or are subject to policies, 
that help achieving a joint dynamic relationship between environmental and economic performances.  
Summing up, we carry out various tests on whether environmental efficiency, deriving from innovation 
and structural changes leading to emission reduction is, following technology-based and externality-
based complementarities relationships (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008a, b), positively associated with firms 
growth. The hypothesis we implicitly assume in the empirical model is that environmental impacts 
(environmental efficiency) are also dependent on the core dynamics of innovation, driven by structural 
factors (e.g. firm size), policy levers, and idiosyncratic strategic factors (R&D). In other words, we 
explicitly test whether the two objectives of the firm: environmental and economic performances, are 
disentangled (no significant correlation), positively related (correlation/complementarity between the 
two), or negatively correlated (substitution or trade-off framework).  
As discussed in Section 3.1, this ‘complementarity’ may be opposed to the ‘substitution hypothesis’ 
which often derives from a usual neoclassic reasoning, which tends to hide the possibility that firms 
adopt environmental innovation in a non policy scenario. In fact, if the firm is optimizing resource 
allocation  in  production  (before  environmental  regulations),  any  additional  abatement  cost  or 
innovation cost deriving from policy enforcement leads, at least in the short run, to an equal reduction 
in productivity. .     
 
3.3. The data set 
3.3.1. Economic performances 
The data-set used in this paper was drawn from AIDA: a commercial database collected by Bureau Van 
Dijck. This large data set of Italian joint stock companies reports balance sheets data such as sales, 
value added, number of employees, labour cost, technical assets, etc. Using this statistical source, for 
the period 2000-2004, we built a panel composed of more than 61,000 Italian manufacturing firms. For 
all  these  firms  we  have  the  following  information:  (i)  the  industry  in  which  they  operate;  (ii)  the 
geographic location; (iii) a size variable measured through the number of employees over the period 
2000-2004. In addition, we have, for a sub-sample of these firms, other two information: i.e., (i) sales 
and (ii) age. This second sample is composed of 36,312 firms. We use these two data sets in relation to 
the stage of the Heckman procedure we consider below. Specifically, the first larger data set is used to 
estimate the selection equation where the dependent variable is constituted by a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 whether all information on sales and age are available for the period 2000-2004 and 
the value 0 otherwise. The second smaller data set is used to estimate the growth equations which allow 
us to investigate on the empirical link between environmental and economic performances, respectively 
emission per employees and turnover. In Tables 1-3 we report the distribution of firms and employees   10 
refereed to the second data set by geographic areas (Table 1), employees classes (Table 2 ) and industry 
(Table 3).           
A potential problem with these kinds of samples is that firms are not randomly chosen (Cingano and 
Schivardi, 2004). However, a comparison with the whole population in terms of frequency distribution 
both by industry and by geographical areas show that our sample is not far from being representative. 
 
Table 1 – Distribution of sample firms by geographic areas 
  Firms  Employees 
  N.  %  N.  % 
North-West  15,164  41.8  1,182,367  50.3 
North-East  11,214  30.9  702,696  29.9 
Centre  6,968  19.2  355,228  15.1 
South  2,966  8.2  110,993  4.7 
Total  36,312  100.0  2,351,284  100.0 
 
Table 2 – Distribution of sample firms by employee classes 
  Firms  Employees 
  N.  %  N.  % 
0-19  15,607  43.0  169,333  7.2 
20-49  12,260  33.8  377,556  16.1 
50-249  7,149  19.7  733,364  31.2 
>249  1,296  3.6  1,071,032  45.6 
Total  36,312  100.0  2,351,284  100.0 
 
Table 3 – Distribution of sample firms by industry (see keys in Appendix) 
  Firms  Employees 
  N.  %  N.  % 
DA  2,584  7.1  158,617  6.7 
DB  3,976  10.9  235,098  10.0 
DC  1,398  3.8  54,027  2.3 
DD  903  2.5  30,123  1.3 
DE  2,306  6.4  118,442  5.0 
DF  127  0.3  14,069  0.6 
DG  1,633  4.5  189,105  8.0 
DH  2,003  5.5  118,953  5.1 
DI  2,179  6.0  143,185  6.1 
DJ  6,895  19.0  365,674  15.6 
DK  5,308  14.6  365,321  15.5 
DL  3,205  8.8  289,120  12.3 
DM  895  2.5  151,985  6.5 
DN  2,900  8.0  117,564  5.0 
Total  36,312  100.0  2,351,284  100.0 
 
 
3.3.2. Emission intensity (environmental technical efficiency performance)    11 
Environmental  performances  are  taken  from  the  NAMEA  source
5.  The  Italian  NAMEA  provides 
detailed data at two digit level on main emissions, value added and employees over 1990-2003. Here we 
focus on 1990-1999 for establishing a lagged structure to the analysis (see below). 
Taking data for the period 1990-1999 in order to impose a lag structure to the modelled relationship, 
and focusing on some primary environmental efficiency measures of industries (tons of emission for 
CO2, SOx, NOX per unit of labour, full time equivalent jobs (FTEJ)), we reconstruct environmental 
technical efficiency ratios at firm level by using sector-level coefficients of emission/FTEJ, i.e. the only 
available proxy for environmental efficiency at sector level, and our AIDA data on firm employees
6. 
This is the only plausible way to recover firm-level data on environmental performances in order to 
exploit the very rich information contained respectively in the Italian NAMEA and AIDA.  
We set up average emission/employee for the two periods 1992-1994 and 1995-1999 for assessing 
relationships at different lag distances between environmental performances and firm’s growth
7. Years 
1990 and 1991 were in the end discarded given problems with sector comparability over time within 
different NAMEA.  Average values are taken both for testing the technical efficiency effects using two 
different time periods, and since emission data are characterised by yearly-specific volatility that is 
mitigated and smoothed by taking averages.   
Table 4 presents summary estimates for the main variables we use in the econometric analysis. 
Table 4 – Descriptive analysis of variables 
Variable and 
acronym  Description   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Y 
  Turnover growth 2000-2004  0.120  0.590  -6.689  10.137 
Turnover 2000  Value of sales in 2000  15.250  1.208  5.860  23.081 
Age   Age of the firm in years  3.089  0.496  1.386  4.955 
 CO2  Environmental efficiency (CO2 on 
FTEJ, average value 1995-999)  12.779  1.655  7.826  21.658 
NOx   Environmental efficiency (NOx on 
FTEJ, average value 1995-1999)  6.640  1.489  2.079  15.797 
SOx   Environmental efficiency (SOx on 
FTEJ, average value 1995-1999)  6.184  1.776  0.693  16.781 
All variables are to be intended in logs 
 
                                                 
5 The main source of data on sectors-pollutants is NAMEA, published by ISTAT (Italian National Statistical Institute, 
www.istat.it). The NAMEA is deriving from real observations carried out on point emission sources year by year. The first 
NAMEA, referring to 1990 data, was published in ISTAT (2001).  
6 Average units of the pollutant produced per employee in the branch. Being based on quantity, and not value, it can be 
taken as an indicator of ‘technical emission efficiency’, thus reflecting the production technology of the branch. Given the 
level of aggregation of NAMEA production branches, E/N can also reflect composition effects, i.e. the combination of 
different E/N in, for example, different industries in the branch DK ‘Machinery’ of NAMEA. 
7 This is a proxy of technical efficiency. As alternative, for future research or further test on same data, we might use 
emissions on value added as a proxy of environmental economic efficiency (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009). The latter may 
grow less than the former if labour productivity increases more than emission per employee (and vice versa). It signifies that 
more value added is generated out from the same or lower emissions. We may then face very different dynamics regarding 
Emissions/employees and E missions/VA depending on the labour productivity dynamics.    12 
3.3. Empirical model and methodological issues 
The empirical specification used in this paper is within the established and well developed literature 
based on Gibrat’s law on proportionate effects. This hypothesis states that the probability of a given 
proportionate change in size during a specified period of time is the same for all firms in a given 
industry, regardless of their size at the beginning of the period (Mansfield, 1962). Following Evans 
(1987a, b), we adopt a ‘growth version’ of this model, specifying the dependent variable as firm size 
growth and not firm size at time t. The independent variable remains size at time t-1. We test this 
hypothesis for sales/turnover
8. Although most studies focus on employment as a proxy for size, there 
are an (increasing) number of investigations on the literature based on other measures of size and 
performances, from profitability to asset value
9.  
We opt for the Gibrat model for a variety of reasons. In absence of a panel of data framework, we deal 
with a hybrid cross section environment with a lag structure in the empirical model that circumvents 
endogeneity. Instead of relying on a simple cross section specification, we prefer using such model 
given that it has shown good performances in previous studies (Cainelli et al., 2007) and are related to a 
well  developed  and  consolidated  literature,  mainly  established  in  the  evolutionary  economics 
environment. Panel analyses may be scope for future (more valuable) research though we remark that 
our lagged model is specifically aimed at coping with endogeneity that would be a methodological and 
conceptual issue in a panel world.  
According to this literature, it is also relevant to deal with exit/entry flows over the period. Gibrat’s law 
could  also  be  valid  for  certain  defined  sub-samples  of  firms  (young,  innovative,  etc.).  From  a 
methodological point of view, this calls for econometric techniques that tackle sample selection bias.  
Finally, some recent papers (Lotti et al., 2007) argue that while the law may fail on an ex ante basis (that 
is on the total firms) since small and medium sized firms (SMEs) grow faster, in an ex post ‘equilibrium’, 
after the market has cleaned the industry through competition pressures, this law may hold for the core 
of survivor firms. Short run and long run differences in the validity of Gibrat’s law may thus occur, and 
they can be associated with exit/entry flows and the evolution of industry towards a core set of firms. 
The period of observation is generally not so long as to detect these differences in the short to long 
run. In any case our study is not primarily focused on testing Gibrat’s law, which is the framework in 
                                                 
8 We use turnover instead of productivity (turnover / employees) for two reasons. First, it is coherent with most Gibrat’s 
literature.  Secondly,  though  it  might  be  of  interest  an  investigation  between  environmental  and  economic  efficiency 
correlation (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009), the period 2000-2004 is atypical, witnessing in Italy a decrease or a stagnation of 
labour productivity for many industrial sectors, partly due to an increase of the workforce and employment (mainly women, 
immigrants, atypical contracts) in association with a low growth of value added.  
9 For a recent work which like ours uses size measures such as real gross output, employment and real value added, see 
Harris and Trainor (2005), who analyse manufacturing sectors in a panel framework to study the relationship between 
growth and size, rejecting the law in all observed cases. Other recent works dealing with measures other or in addition to 
employment size are Dunne and Hughes (1994), Delmar et al. (2003), Audretsch et al. (2004),  Del Monte and Papagni 
(2003), who deal with Italian manufacturing firms in 1989-1997. A very detailed and comprehensive survey in this literature 
is presented by Santarelli et al., (2006), to which we refer the reader.    13 
which we test out hypotheses. Nevertheless, our result should be interpreted as biased towards the 
short to medium term
10. 
The specification we used to empirically test the relationship between emission intensities and firms 
size growth is (Evans, 1988a, 1988b): 
 
 (1)             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i g g i i i i i i i t i v age Y Y Y Y + + + + = − =   β X
'
i , 2000 , 2000 , 2004 , , 4 ln ln ln ln ln δ γ α  
 
where  2004 , i Y and  2000 , i Y are sales of firm i in 2004 and 2000,  i age  denotes firm age,  i X  is a set of 
variables, including the emission intensity at sector level, and finally  i v  is the error term with the usual 
statistical properties.  
It is worth noting that this relationship is also investigated by specifying quadratic terms both for sales 
and age and for emission intensity indicators. This is done in order to capture potential non-linear 
effects among these covariates and the dependent variable.  
To  overcome  potential  selection  bias,  we  estimated  equation  (1)  using  the  Heckman  two-step 
procedure (Cainelli et al., 2007)
11. In the first step we estimate a selection equation where the dependent 
variable is constituted by a dummy variable taking value 1 whether all information on sales and age are 
available for the period 2000-2004 and the value 0 otherwise. As explanatory variables of this selection 
equation  we  use  four  geographic  (North_West,  North_East,  Centre  and  South)  and  four  size  (D19, 
D20_49, D50_249 and D250) dummies. The residuals of this  regression  were used to construct a 
selection bias factor, which is equivalent to the Inverse Mill’s Ratio. This factor accounts for the effects 
of all unmeasured characteristics which are related to the selection variable. The Inverse Mill’s Ratio is 
introduced as an extra explanatory variable in the second stage of the Heckman procedure, which 
consists of estimating the growth equation (1) using Maximum Likelihood estimators and using the 
selection bias control factor as an additional independent variable. In this way, we obtain efficient and 
consistent estimates of the unknown coefficients of the equations. Finally, since emission intensity data 
are calculated at firm level by exploiting emissions/employees ratio from the industry level, we estimate 
                                                 
10 Here we cannot directly assess the role of policies as the driver of innovation, or consequently performance. Nevertheless, 
if we exclude anticipation strategies, the period under observation is one when major policies were still not implemented at 
EU and national levels. We can assume therefore that such innovation strategies are purely endogenous and depend on 
firms’ strategic management, as (discussed) in Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009). This could explain in part the coherent but 
reduced number of first mover firms focussing on innovation for environmental purposes.  
11 In our case, the dependent variable in the first stage takes the value 1 if all information (including sales and age) on firm i 
are available, and 0 otherwise. The covariates used in the first stage to estimate the selection equation are the following: (i) a 
constant term, (ii) four geographic dummies (North-West; North-East, South and Centre), (iii) four size dummies (D19, D20_49, 
D50_249 and D250), and finally (iv) nine industry dummies.    14 
standard errors, that are robust to arbitrary cluster correlation. This procedure allows us to account for 
clustering in emission intensity data derived from NAMEA (Wooldridge, 2003, 2006)
 12.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
We sum up the main results of our investigations. First, we find expected result in the first step, that 
shows the relevant influence by size, industry and geographic location.  
Secondly, we focus on the core aspects of second stage regressions, where the proper Gibrat model is 
investigated (tables 5-7 for the three different categories of emissions).  
As far as the regressions without environmental performances (not shown) indicates significant and 
negative signs attached to age and turnover: firm growth is more likely to be experienced by small 
firms, an expected plausible result, and by younger firms, again as expected.  
The  relationship  appears  to  be  nevertheless  non-linear:  quadratic  forms  show  U  shapes  for  both 
factors. This may signify that (very) young and (very) old firms are the ones experiencing higher growth 
over  2000-2004
13.  The  same  holds  regarding  the  scale/size  of  firms:  low  and  high  turnovers  per 
employee  are  associated  to  higher  growths.  All  in  all,  non-linearity  is  empirically  relevant.  Those 
outcomes do not change when we include environmental efficiency indicators (see below). 
As a third step, regarding the core analyses of environmental – economic relationships, we first note 
that linear forms in tables 5-7 seem to support a positive and significant coefficient for all the three 
emission categories. Thus, recalling H1, we would be in front of a (usual) ‘trade off’ between different 
kinds  of  performance:  the  higher  emission  intensity  per  employee  (over  1995-99),  the  higher  firm 
growth  is  (over  2000-2004).  Firm  growth  thus  appears  ‘not  constrained’  by  bad  environmental 
performances; on the reversal side, more environmental efficient firms (perhaps within greener sectors) 
do not touch with hand the payoffs of ‘greener investments’. 
Motivations may be many and various. In part this evidence may be linked to weak policy pressures on 
more polluting firms, mainly when focusing on a global externality like CO2 which has been regulated 
from early-2000s on through the IPPC directive and the emission trading (EU ETS) scheme for CO2. 
In  any  case  we  do  not  find  here  evidence  of  proactive  co-dynamics  between  environmental  and 
economic  realms
14.  A  positive  sign  in  the  estimated  coefficient  here  means  that  increasing 
environmental  efficiency  leads  to  some  economic  costs  in  terms  of  lower  growth.  Those  are  the 
‘implied  cost’  of  eventual  improvements  in  environmental  performances,  that  should  be  weighted 
                                                 
12 As additional analysis, in order to circumvent the problem of exploiting as source emission sector data, we estimated fitted 
values of environmental efficiency for firms, using as regressors in the first stage R&D expenses, size and sector dummies. 
In the end, looking at methodological oriented literature and comparing results of the two estimation techniques, which here 
do not differ much, we opted for the specific cluster correlation technique for estimation of parameters, that is offering 
more robust estimates.  
13 We note that this period is one of the most critical, in negative terms, for the Italian economy.  
14 We stress this is the ‘average’ figure regarding manufacturing firms.    15 
against market (appropriable) and non market benefits accruing from such improvements. Viceversa, 
being less environmentally benign relax the constraints to growth.  
It is worth noting, nevertheless, that the size of the estimated coefficients is not large, besides that for 
CO2: trade off are statistically significant, but quite negligible in terms of impacts for SOx and NOx. 
Since also the size of coefficients (‘economic significance’) matters as well as its statistical significance 
(Ziliak and Mcloskey, 2004), environmental performance does not seem a primary cost and constraint 
to growth if compared to other factors affecting firm targets
15. The result for CO2 emissions seems to 
highlight that, by being CO2 emission related to energy consumption and end-of-pipe solutions for 
CO2 emissions being limited, to reduce CO2 emissions may result in a stronger negative effect on firm 
growth compared to other air pollutants.  
Those outcomes also do not mirror the environmental-economic ‘efficiency’ co-dynamics found by 
Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009) who use panel NAMEA data over 1990-2001 for emission intensity of 
value added and value added per employee at the NAMEA-sector level. Nevertheless, the two studies, 
though conceptually close, are hardly comparable from an empirical point of view: We here exploit a 
lagged model instead of a panel, with some differences in the considered period, and the analysis was 
there on the all macro NAMEA sectors, not just manufacturing. Both studies point out the importance 
of  non-linear  paths  characterising  the  links  and  evolution  of  economic  and  environmental 
performances.  
Finally, the ‘non linear’ (quadratic models at right hand columns of tables 5-7) analyses on the income-
environment relationship here envisaged tells us additional insights {H2}. In fact, regarding CO2, a 
robust inverted U, or bell shaped
16, endogenous dynamics seem to signal the possibility of experiencing 
a reduction of growth after a threshold is reached. The income-environment relationship is not similar 
across the range of environmental performances/efficiency. Very inefficient performances in terms of 
emissions per unit of labour penalise firms even in the core performances. An explanation among 
others may be that pollution effects are (fully) externalized up to a point, then, when a threshold is 
surpassed, bad environmental performances present negative effects on firm performances. A linked 
argument is that of ‘diminishing marginal returns’ of the ‘input’ emission, related to energy use and 
capital intensity. Returns that may also become negative as shown here, even from a private persctive, 
without accounting the social cost of emission production
17. 
                                                 
15 At least for SOx and NOx, the growth decrease that ‘follows’ an environmental improvement of 1% in efficiency is less 
than 0.1%, but half percentage point of growth when considering CO2..  
16 We remark that the estimation of standard errors, that are robust to arbitrary cluster correlation has improved CO2 results. 
The  bell  shape  was  just  weakly  significant  without  such  a  correction.  Even  for  NOx,  the  quadratic  specification  was 
completely insignificant. 
17 The bell shaped curve also recall the possibility of envisaging an ‘optimal’ growth, associated to the turning point. This 
optimal growth is still not reached here, and is close for SOx and NOx. We nevertheless stress that also external costs 
should be accounted for when determining such optimal growth of firms. A balance of private and social costs/benefits of 
pollution is needed. Given that estimates for the abatement costs and external costs of emission are available in the UE,   16 
Putting it under a different perspective, a potential co-dynamics between economic and environmental 
performances emerges when the relationship is non-linear. The negative sign of the quadratic term 
means  that  higher  emissions  per  unit  of  labour  hamper  growth  potential,  and  vice  versa,  thus, 
improvements in environmental performances are associated to higher growth for firms. We remark 
that the non-linear shape is here to be interpreted, though embedded in a dynamic relationship, on the 
basis  of  the  cross  section  dimension.  The  weight  is  thus  on  cross  firm/sector  heterogeneity,  not 
temporal heterogeneity that could be captured in panel analysis (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009; Mazzanti et 
al., 2007).  
Much of it may depend on our eyes on complementarity between ‘private and public elements’ of the 
emission  abatement  that  could  be  targeted  by  the  same  technological  dynamics.  Environmental 
innovations  often  give  rise  to  a  ‘dual  externality’,  providing  the  typical  R&D  spillovers  and  also 
reducing environmental externalities (Jaffe et al., 2003; Rennings, 2000). Therefore, innovation aimed at 
reducing  environmental  impact  may  spur  positive  innovation  spillovers.  This  element  of 
complementarity could explain why environmental efficiency may be linked to turnover dynamics.  
Another joint motivation is the issues of rent generation and appropriability as well as complementarity 
in production between environmental and economic (technological) objectives we discussed in section 
3. The latter may depend on the features of the environmental ‘goods’ we deal with (Bruvoll et al., 2003; 
Kotchen, 2005; Rubbelke, 2003;  Loschel and Rubbelke, 2005). 
We may note that for CO2   this threshold, or turning point of the income environment bellàshaped 
curve, is nevertheless outside the range of observed values for turnover growth over 2000-2004
18. It is 
then a signal of a potential future reversal of the trade off into co-dynamics even for mixed pubic 
goods ,like carbon dioxide, whose abatement benefits are not always fully appropriated by firms. 
The  situation  for  NOx  is  just  slightly  different:  recalling  that  the  coefficient  in  the  linear  form  is 
negligible in size, turnover dynamics appear as being associated to a trade off for a certain part of the 
relationship. Then a joint dynamics, as before, could characterise the relationship with win win gains. If 
we estimate the turning point of the bell curve, we note that the NOx one is lower with respect to 
CO2.  This  is  plausible.  Though  this  threshold  is  still  outside  the  range  of  observed  values,  thus 
predominating the trade off between economic and environmental performances, the ‘fruits’ of a joint 
dynamics  seem  here  closer  (in  time),  given  the  higher  appropriability  of  rents  from  innovations 
improving the NOx-related efficiency.  
Finally, results for SOx are similar to those for NOx. All in all, all three main environmental indicators 
tell a similar story. The short-to-medium term relationship is characterised more by trade off between 
                                                                                                                                                                  
some cost benefit analysis may be carried out, balancing the losses (benefits) of manufacturing (de) growth, in the portion of 
the relationship where a trade off emerges, and the benefits (costs) of emission reduction (increase).   
18 It is then relevant to calculate the turning point to observe whether this is within the observed range of values. Since it is 
well within the range, it means that besides a share of firms for which the relationship is not constituted by a trade off, the 
real dynamic is driven by an opposite trajectory wherein environmental productivity and economic productivity diverge.    17 
environmental efficiency and firm growth in opposition to co-evolutionary dynamics that nevertheless 
appear ‘at the horizon’ through the non linear relationships robustly emerging from the exploitation of 
a correction procedure for ‘cluster correlation’. For SOx the threshold turning point show the closest 
value to real observed ones. Co-efficiency dynamics are close to be achieved
19. Innovation and policy 
levers, though not directly investigated here, probably drive stronger trajectories of co-efficiency for 
SOx, which is the emission that has witnessed the strongest decrease in the last 20 years.
20 
 
Table 5 – The impact of environmental efficiency on firms’ growth: estimates  
Dep. Var:  ( ) t i Y , 4 ln      Heckit
(a)  Heckit
(a) 
  Coeff.  t values  Coeff.  t values 
SELECTION EQ.  [1]  [2] 
North_West  0.663**  8.05  0.067**  8.28 
North_East  0.032**  2.38  0.033**  2.42 
Centre  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
South  -0.147**  -6.59  -0.150**  -6.84 
D19  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
D20_49  0.569**  20.11  0.563**  19.03 
D50_249  0.645**  12.23  0.638**  11.96 
D250  0.322**  5.05  0.330**  5.21 
Industry dummies (13)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SECOND STAGE EQ.         
( ) 2000 ln turnover   -2.559**  -21.32  -2.639**  -24.69 
( ) age ln   -0.820**  -14.22  -0.852**  -15.43 
( )
2
2000 ln turnover   0.075**  18.08  0.078**  22.02 
( )
2 ln age   0.108**  12.31  0.112**  13.95 
( ) 1999 _ 1995 ln cox   0.536**  2.64  0.253**  2.58 
( )
2
1999 _ 1995 ln cox   …  …  -0.007**  -2.37 
         
Lambda  -0.340**  -6.93  -0.330**  -6.60 
         
N. Obs.   61,219  61,219 
Censored Obs.  24,907  24,907 
Uncensored Obs.  36,312  36,312 
Clustering   14 industries  14 industries 
                                                 
19 Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009) note that in the case of air pollutants, provided their emission can improve as a by-product of 
innovations in energy efficiency and inter fuel substitution (i.e. ‘ancillary benefits’ of reducing GHGs), there may also be 
specific  capital  stocks  capable  of  reducing  some  of  them,  e.g.  end-of  -pipe  technologies  reducing  SOx,  and  the  new 
plant/equipment may be both more capital intensive and less air emissions intensive compared to GHG intensity. This may 
also take place because of regulation. It should be noted that prior to the Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (IPPC) 
directive and Europe Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), GHGs were not regulated directly, whereas most air 
pollutants have been closely regulated since the 1970s in most countries. It is likely that regulation has been the spur for 
increasing capital-labour ratio to reduce these pollutants.  
20 The results do not change if we use average emission intensity over 1992-1994 instead of 1995-1999 {H1}. The two series 
‘average’ are highly correlated. This may mean that more than by the dynamics of emission efficiency, the relationship 
between economic and environmental objectives is affected by structural and sectoral features, that are affected only in the 
medium/long run scenario.  
   18 
Wald chi2(1)  54.35  50.44 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
(a) Regressions also include a constant term. Standard errors are robust and adjusted for 14 clusters. ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Table 6 – The impact of environmental efficiency on firms’ growth: estimates  
Dep. Var:  ( ) t i Y , 4 ln      Heckit
(a)  Heckit
(a) 
  Coeff.  t values  Coeff.  t values 
SELECTION EQ.  [1]  [2] 
North_West  0.067**  7.92  0.068**  7.62 
North_East  0.033**  2.34  0.034**  2.41 
Centre  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
South  -0.150**  -6.37  -0.156**  -6.51 
D19  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
D20_49  0.564**  18.21  0.554**  17.64 
D50_249  0.634**  11.32  0.619**  11.00 
D250  0.308**  4.69  0.317**  4.92 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SECOND STAGE EQ.         
( ) 2000 ln turnover   -2.527**  -22.23  -2.635**  -27.01 
( ) age ln   -0.820**  -13.89  -0.859**  -15.04 
( )
2
2000 ln turnover   0.074**  18.45  0.078**  23.28 
( )
2 ln age   0.107**  11.86  0.113**  13.15 
( ) 1999 _ 1995 ln nox   0.070**  2.40  0.234**  4.78 
( )
2
1999 _ 1995 ln nox   …  …  -0.011**  -4.27 
         
Mills lambda  -0.330**  -6.60  -0.311**  -5.55 
         
N. Obs.   61,219  61,219 
Censored Obs.  24,907  24,907 
Uncensored Obs.  36,312  36,312 
Clustering   14 industries  14 industries 
Wald chi2(1)  48.18  33.68 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
(a) Regressions also include a constant term. Standard errors are robust and adjusted for 14 clusters. ** 
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Table 7 – The impact of environmental efficiency on firms’ growth: estimates  
Dep. Var:  ( ) t i Y , 4 ln      Heckit
(a)  Heckit
(a) 
  Coeff.  t values  Coeff.  t values 
SELECTION EQ.  [1]  [2] 
North_West  0.065**  7.79  0.065**  8.01 
North_East  0.032**  2.36  0.032**  2.40 
Centre  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
South  -0.144**  -6.40  -0.146**  -6.52 
D19  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
D20_49  0.574**  21.31  0.567**  20.17 
D50_249  0.654**  12.46  0.646**  12.24 
D250  0.332**  5.14  0.334**  5.29 
Industry dummies (13)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SECOND STAGE EQ.         
( ) 2000 ln turnover   -2.582**  -20.82  -2.648**  -23.99 
( ) age ln   -0.818**  -13.12  -0.845**  -14.61 
( )
2
2000 ln turnover   0.076**  17.79  0.079**  21.19 
( )
2 ln age   0.108**  12.15  0.112**  13.14 
( ) 1999 _ 1995 ln sox   0.041**  2.20  0.122**  2.37 
( )
2
1999 _ 1995 ln sox   …  …  -0.006**  -2.13 
         
Lambda  -0.348**  -7.25  -0.340**  -6.66 
         
N. Obs.   61,219  61,219 
Censored Obs.  24,907  24,907 
Uncensored Obs.  36,312  36,312 
Clustering  14 industries  14 industries 
Wald chi2(1)  60.00  52.34 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
(a) Regressions also include a constant term. Standard errors are robust and adjusted for 14 clusters. ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
5. Conclusions       
This paper presents evidences on the empirical link between firm size /economic performances in 
terms of sales/turnover growth and emission intensity indicators capturing environmental technical 
efficiency, by originally using a very large firm based data set of thousands of Italian manufacturing 
firms.  This  data  set  refers  to  the  period  2004-2000  for  turnover  growth  and  to  1992-1999  for 
environmental  efficiency  performances.  We  test  the  extent  to  which  (past)  environmental 
efficiency/intensity, which is driven by structural features and firm strategic actions, including eventual 
responses to policies, influences firm’s growth. The main added value of the paper is the use of real 
environmental  performances  data  merged  with  economic  performances  indicators  for  a  very  large 
sample of firms in a dynamic perspective. The evidence we provide is basically ‘policy-free’ for carbon   21 
dioxide  since  Italy  did  not  experienced  policies  over  the  90’s.  Though  policy  valuation  will  be  an 
interesting  point  to  be  added  in  the  future,  evidence  on  how  firms  behave  without  regulatory 
interventions  is  also  of  high  interest  to  understand  the  relationship  between  economic  and 
environmental performances, as a food for thought for management and policy making. 
First, a typical trade off generally appears to emerge for the three environmental emission categories we 
analyse  here,  when  focusing  on  a  linear  specification  of  the  income-environment  relationship:  less 
environmental oriented productions allow higher degrees of freedom and less constraint for growth. 
We do not find evidence of current pro-active co-dynamics between environmental and economic 
realms.  Increasing  environmental  efficiency  leads  to  some  economic  costs  in  terms  of  lower  firm 
growth, at least for our manufacturing firms and in this short/medium run oriented empirical scenario. 
Viceversa, being less environmentally benign relax the constraints to growth. However, the size of the 
estimated coefficients is not large besides CO2: trade off are statistically significant but quite negligible 
in terms of effective average impacts. As example, for SOx and NOx growth is reduced by less than 
0.10% for a 1% increase of environmental efficiency; the percentage move up to half a point of growth 
for CO2 ‘abatements’. All in all, then, the ‘environmental factor’ does not seem a primary cost and 
constraint to growth, if compared to other factors affecting firm targets and firm competitiveness.  
In addition, and highly important, non linear analyses of the relationships, nevertheless, tell us to some 
respect a different story. Results show that the link between emission efficiency and firm growth is in 
fact robustly non linear. Inverted U shapes appear for all three emission efficiency indicators: this may 
be a signal that both firm strategies and recent policy efforts, are affecting the relationship between 
environmental efficiency and economic performance, possibly turning it in the near future from a trade 
off to joint complementary/co-dynamics. Though our evidence is of cross sectional nature capturing 
sector heterogeneity more than time dynamics, we might affirm that the potential co-dynamics between 
environmental and economic performances appears close from the evidence, and more likely to be 
achieved in the next future for NOx and SOx. This evidence is plausible with the higher appropriability 
of (higher) environmental performances deriving from innovation actions of manufacturing firms.  
The story we discuss here for Italy over the 1990s is a sort of ‘policy free’ scenario; it is thus consistent 
that CO2 appears as the environmental factor less likely to be associated to win win complementary 
income-environment  dynamics  in  the  next  future.  The  endogenous  evolution  of  income  and 
environmental factors linked by the web of firms-based and sector-specific innovation contents may 
not  suffice,  as  highlighted  by  other  studies,  for  coping  with  this  externality.  The  relatively  less 
significant evidence for carbon dioxide also calls for policy advices in favour of more stringent policies 
for emission that are characterised by a largest part of public good (not appropriable) content.   22 
Our results could open a new window of empirical evidence that supports the existence of a dynamic 
and evolving of trade-off between environmental and economic strategies of industrial firms, up to 
achieve a complementarity between the two.  
Further research rooting on this paper may be provided in the future both by using panel data analysis 
over  2000-2004,  exploiting  new  updated  NAMEA  data,  and  estimating  the  reverse  causal  effects 
(economic performance ￿ environmental performances) when emission data after 2004 are available. 
In the context of this century, some analysis of policy effects may be introduced, among others those 
deriving from the European emission trading scheme for carbon dioxide operating since 2005. 
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Table A.1 – Classification of manufacturing activities  
Codes  Description 
DA  Food products, beverages and tobacco 
DB  Textile and clothing 
DC  Leather and leather products 
DD  Wood and wood products 
DE 
Pulp, paper, and paper products, publishing and 
printing 
DF  Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 
DG 
Chemicals, chemical products, and man-made 
fibres 
DH  Rubber and plastic products 
DI  Non-metallic mineral products 
DJ  Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
DK  Machinery and equipment  
DL  Electrical and optical equipment 
DM  Transport equipment 
DN  Other manufacturing   
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